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Resumen
Este artículo busca determinar el efecto del poder político en el de-
sempeño de mercado de las plantas, y en la productividad agregada
de la economía. Para tal efecto, se utilizan datos empresas colombia-
nas del sector manufacturero para el período 1990-1998, y se constru-
yen variables de poder político. Se encuentra en primer lugar que el
poder político del sector tiene un efecto significativo y positivo en los
aranceles a los que se enfrenta una planta. En segundo lugar, encon-
tramos que una planta que pertenece a un sector con mayor poder
político puede sobrevivir presentando niveles de productividad me-
nores. Por último, calculamos que se encuentra que el efecto del po-
der político, dado que permite la supervivencia de plantas menos
productivas, llega a reducir la productividad agregada en un prome-
dio de 9.86% anual.
Palabras clave: estructura y desempeño de mercado, implementación
de políticas, productividad agregada, procesos políticos.
Clasificación JEL: L100, D780, O470, D720.
Introduction
Resource reallocation is one of the most important mechanisms by
which market economies are able to affect production units, by get-
ting rid of the most unproductive plants and thus enhancing the econo-
my’s aggregate productivity. In an analysis of a plant-level longitudinal
dataset for Colombia for the years 1982 through 1998, Eslava et al.
(2004) find that reallocation accounts for most of the change in ag-
gregate productivity. In their paper, the effect of institutional changes
on the reallocation process is emphasized. Reforms, in particular mar-
ket-oriented ones, are, in principle, intended to weaken distortions by
establishing profitability as the main determinant of survival among
plants. When this is the case, productive plants are defined as those
that continually make more profits and stay in business, while those
that are defined as unproductive lose market shares and eventually
shut down. This constitutes a productivity enhancing market selec-
tion mechanism (Jovanovic, 1982). Since the plants that manage to57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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survive are the most productive, this mechanism ends up raising ag-
gregate productivity by promoting efficient reallocation (Roberts et
al., 1997). By contrast, other types of reforms may shield unproduc-
tive plants from market dynamics, allowing them to continue making
profits and survive, and thus decrease aggregate productivity.
Economic policies may therefore widen or narrow the gap between
the survival of a plant and market fundamentals by impacting on the
actual exposure to those fundamentals. We understand market funda-
mentals as constituting a series of economic traits that characterize
plants, or plants and their respective markets. For instance, these might
constitute production costs, sale prices, factors hired, and, most espe-
cially, productivity. When referring to the ‘exposure’ to market funda-
mentals, we mean the extent to which differences in productivity levels,
prices or demand shocks determine plant survival. The final effect of
policies depends very much on which plants are affected. If differen-
tial treatment between sectors is the case, then shielding sectors with
unproductive plants will clearly be more harmful to aggregate pro-
ductivity than shielding more productive sectors (Neil et al., 1992).
Among those institutions and policies showing differential treatment
between sectors, we find sector-specific production subsidies, tariffs
and import quotas, public expenditure focused on one sector’s pro-
duction, environmental regulations, and tax exemptions.
A straightforward example of institutional barriers against efficient
reallocation and the resulting differential treatment of sectors can be
found in trade policy, particularly with respect to tariffs. Although
this is not necessarily the case with all trade policies, many shield
certain sectors from market forces and market selection dynamics. In
an attempt to explain these policies’ heterogeneous treatment between
sectors, we might naturally turn to the literature on political economy,
bargaining and special interests. Most results point to a strong rela-
tionship—one that is probably causal—between the political power
of special interest groups and policy outcomes (Grossman, and
Helpman, 1994).
An explanation of the determinants of differential policies between
sectors constitutes the first subject of interest in this study. The sec-
ond one is related to the effects of those determinants on plant per-218 218 218 218 218
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formance indicators, such as productivity and survival. More specifi-
cally, we are interested in the political power exerted by some sectors
to determine these policies. We consider this to be the most important
channel in this process. The main goals of this paper are, in the first
place, to empirically link political/lobby power and policies; in the
second place, political/lobby power and the probability of a plant ex-
iting the market; and finally, the effect of the political power on ag-
gregate productivity.
More specifically, in terms of the first objective, this study attempts
to empirically explain the relationship between a sector’s political
power and the treatment the sector receives through trade policy. To
do this, a set of empirical models are tested in order to calculate the
effect of political power on trade policy. Political power is captured
through a constructed political power index that weighs the produc-
tion (or employment) share of each sector in its the region with the
region’s votes share in the national political scene. This is done in
order to capture the importance a production sector’s economic
strength and the respective region’s political strength have in deter-
mining the sector’s political power. In order to have an effective im-
pact, it is expected that these two conditions should necessarily happen
simultaneously. This is due to the fact that, a production sector’s eco-
nomic importance is only able to translate its economic importance
into effective political power to the extent that the region enjoys po-
litical importance in the country. We use tariffs to capture trade policy,
as they meet the requirements that interest us—they affect the eco-
nomic performance of plants—in particular probability of their exit-
ing the market—and they exhibit differential treatment across sectors.
A probit market selection model is then estimated in order to measure
the effect of political power on the probability of the survival of plants.
We also attempt to capture the effects of trade policies as well as of
other benefits not so easily quantified (this, by making adjustments to
the model that controls for tariffs). Moreover, we construct variables
that indicate the extent of a sector’s affiliation with strong lobbying
associations and large economic groups. This allows the political
power constructed index to account for the political influence of a
specific sector beyond that derived merely from organized lobbying.
Finally, we estimate a model that determines aggregate productivity,57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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both under the influence of political power, and where it is absent.
This is done in order to quantify the cost in terms of aggregate pro-
ductivity on the process of efficient reallocation implied by the influ-
ence of political power.
This work benefits from the database constructed by let al. (2004) on
Colombian Manufacturing Plants1. The period that this database cov-
ers (1982-1998) allows us to include the two senate and presidential
periods encompassed by the period of our estimations (1990-1998).
This period is of particular interest as many market-oriented reforms,
including changes in the tariff structure, were implemented then.
Among the most relevant results we find is that a sector’s political
power has a positive and significant effect on the tariffs it faces. We
also find that it is slightly more convenient for a sector to be politi-
cally significant in presidential elections than in senatorial elections.
All results are robust to the inclusion of population controls and dif-
ferent specifications of the political power index. When we only use
the specification of the political power index that takes into account
the share of votes, both the magnitude of the effect and the signifi-
cance decrease considerably. This shows that political importance is
only relevant when the sector is economically important. Finally, we
find that the resulting aggregate productivity where there is an ab-
sence of political power is significantly larger than the resulting ag-
gregate productivity where it is present.
This structure thus links two strands of the reviewed literature: that
on market selection and that on special interest groups and lobbying.
The connection seems natural once we notice the extent to which
market selection depends on reforms and policies, and how these in
turn depend on political processes. In general, it is considered that an
analysis of this mechanism is helpful to understanding why heteroge-
neous policies are applied across sectors, and the effect this has on the
exposure of each sector to market fundamentals.
1 This is constructed using data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey. The database, which
includes measures of plant-level productivity that use individual plant prices—measures
the productivity more accurately than traditional estimates using a sector-level deflator.
This improves the results of the market selection model, so that the effects on productivities
attributed to political variables do not stem from unobserved movements in prices.220 220 220 220 220
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This work contributes to the still scarce empirical literature concern-
ing the effects of lobbying and political power on market selection
and aggregate productivity. The results achieved here could help make
policy-makers more aware of the magnitudes of the costs implied by
some distortive policies, especially when differentially applied to sec-
tors that are not necessarily the most productive. Another contribu-
tion of this work is its calculation of political power indices and
dichotomous variables indicating sector/plant affiliation with strong
lobbying economic associations and large corporate economic groups.
Case studies from Echavarría et al., Lora (2001), and Rettberg (1998)
are reviewed in order to put together a fairly comprehensive list of the
economic associations and economic groups found in Colombia. Fi-
nally, this study creates a digital database providing information on
the senate and presidential election results at the departmental level.
The official results for elections prior to 1998 have, until now, only
been available in printed format.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. In section I, we review the
literature, both for market selection and for special interests politics.
In section II, we construct a sector political power index. With this
compound index, we attempt to make the best of the available politi-
cal information (by region, that is, department) and economic per-
formance information (by sector). We then examine the effects of the
sectors’ respective political power on the outcome of policy decisions.
In section III, we test a market selection empirical model wherein
political power is introduced; this is in addition to the economic fun-
damentals and reform measures of other market selection models
(Eslava et al. 2004). Finally, in section IV, we present an estimation
of the aggregate productivity that would occur in the absence of the
distorting effect of political power. Section V summarizes the results.
I. A review of literature
In this section we review the two strands of literature covering the
subjects most relevant to our work: that on market selection and that
on special interests groups. At all times, it is our intention to give a
general overview of each subject. Nonetheless, we focus on those
transmission channels most relevant to our empirical exercise. While57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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reviewing the literature on market selection, we focus on the effects
policies have on market selection; likewise, the effects of market se-
lection on aggregate productivity. On the other hand, while reviewing
special interest groups, we focus on the effects lobbying has on sectoral
policies and productivity.
A. Market selection
The exit and entry of plants play an important role in an economy’s
dynamics. While market selection dynamics depend largely on eco-
nomic circumstances, they also affect those economic circumstances
in return. For instance, sector adverse demand shocks may cause un-
productive plants to go out of business, and allow only those produc-
tive enough to cope with the new situation to survive. This increases
the average productivity of the relevant sector. Sector adverse demand
shocks are affected by the productivity levels of plants entering the
sector, as well as by the new conditions in the productivity levels of
incumbent plants. One strand of literature proposes a strong relation-
ship between productivity and plant survival (Hopenhayn, 1992). More
specifically, we can say that a plant with very low productivity levels
relative to others in the sector will, under regular market conditions,
eventually exit the market (Roberts et al., 1997). In the absence of
distortions, lower productivity require higher costs and prices for the
same products, which eventually leads to the elimination of that plant’s
demand. How long the plant survives then reflects the elasticity of
demand and the demand shocks confronting the plant; in the presence
of a close substitute, no plant could stand a strong decrease in produc-
tivity for very long (Jovanovic et al.,1994). An unproductive plant
would have a hard time enduring such adverse conditions for long,
and the process would occur rather smoothly. There would be a pro-
ductivity enhancing reallocation process, one which works on the basis
of economic fundamentals, in particular, those related to productivity.
Jovanovic (1982) states that markets make unproductive plants fail.
In this way, market selection makes an industry mature and average
profits rise. The concept of creative destruction (Bartelsman et al.,
2004) supports the convenience of a strong market renewal or market
selection mechanism as a condition for productivity growth (Davis et
al., 1999). Following this line of thought, Jovanovic adds that high
concentrations in markets can be a sign of greater efficiency rather222 222 222 222 222
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than constituting a threat to it, since larger plants earn higher rents
and low rent earners are pushed out of the market2.
Empirical research has also been conducted concerning the role of
productivity in market selection. Bartelsman and Doms (2000) re-
view the strand of literature using longitudinal micro data, and re-
mark that the results generally show that both entering and exiting
plants have lower productivity than incumbent ones3. Eslava et al.
(2004) find a different result for Colombia; according to them, here,
entering plants show larger productivities and exiting plants lower
ones than incumbent plants. Eslava et al. (2004) expand this discus-
sion for the case of Colombia by introducing the effect of the institu-
tional reforms carried out during the 1990s. One interesting result
describes the extent to which distortions make adjustment expensive.
After a wave of market-oriented reforms, started in 1991 with the
promulgation of a new political constitution, the productivity differ-
ential between entering and incumbent plants decreased. This prob-
ably reflected lower adjustment costs, on the basis of which, incumbent
plants were equally able as entering plants to make use of the latest
vintage technology. Additionally, the exit rate of plants increased, while
the relative productivity of exiting plants against incumbent ones fell
even further following reforms as compared to previous years.
The facts empirically found by Eslava et al. (2004) might reflect that
market-oriented reforms generally lower the protection given to some
unproductive plants, allowing them to persist in the market despite
low productivity levels. This protection may take many forms, one of
them being trade policy. We show that institutions and policies
strengthen or weaken the connection between a plant’s performance
(and its probability of exit) and market determinants or fundamentals.
Thus, in the presence of strong distortions, survival becomes likely
for low productivity plants, as such distortions work as a shield against
market forces that would otherwise force plants to either increase pro-
ductivity or leave.
2 This process is altered when there exists firms acting strategically and engaging in collu-
sive actions. There is an important strand of literature dealing with the strategic behavior
of firms. This strand is mentioned in the next section, though it is covered thoroughly.
3 For example, they refer to the results reached by Baldwin for Canada for the last two
decades (1995).57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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Whether the entry and exit of plants is closely determined by produc-
tivity or is shielded by external distortions is important because of the
strong connection between the processes of market selection and ag-
gregate productivity and growth. Plant exit is productivity enhancing
if those plants exiting are those with lower productivities. If this is the
case, the surviving plants, which already had higher productivities,
would increase their shares of production. Consequently, the weight
their productivities have in the calculation of aggregate productivity
would also increase. Baily et al. (1992) find that the exit of low pro-
ductivity plants is effectively accompanied by increases in the share
of the output of high productivity plants; their exit, therefore, affects
the growth of manufacturing productivity.
Market-oriented reforms are often sought because of the positive ef-
fects exposure to competition, greater access to a wider variety of
higher quality inputs, and learning effects have on productivity (Amiti,
2005)4. We are aware the research of a good many authors focuses on
these effects (e.g., Arbeláez et al., 2006; and Meléndez et al., 2006).
Nonetheless, we do not focus on them here. As we mentioned before,
our argument is concerned with the effects of decreasing shares for
lower productivity plants (decreasing to zero when they exit) and in-
creasing shared for higher productivity ones. We not necessarily claim
that surviving plants increase their productivity as a consequence of
market-oriented reforms; rather we concentrate on the productivity
growth brought about by shares reallocation.
If the selection mechanism is distorted, as mentioned above, low-pro-
ductivity plants may not be driven out of business, and there will be
no positive effects on aggregate productivity.
If the whole market selection process is subject to distortions, the
dynamics can be strongly altered. Changes may result from policies,
4 Amiti et. al, (2005) perform estimations for Indonesia to quantify the effects of a tariff
reduction both on inputs and output. They also consider the fact that more plants that are
already relatively more productive increase their market shares; at all times, they take into
account the productivity enhancing effects of liberalization. Also, Tybout et al. (1991) find
that, during the liberalization of Chilean trade that took place during the 1970s, the firms
located in the sectors with the highest reductions in tariffs were also those that experienced
higher efficiency gains (per firm, not aggregate).224 224 224 224 224
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institutions, or market distortions that dampen, or sometimes even
stop or reverse the productivity improvements mentioned above. In
fact, many studies focus on how this process occurs over time in dif-
ferent economic and institutional environments (Bartelsman et al.,
2004). If other aspects apart from performance—such as political in-
fluence—determine the survival or market share of each plant, then
market selection, will not necessarily be productivity-enhancing. Un-
der such circumstances, plants that survive may not be the most pro-
ductive but the ones best able to attain greater protection through
policies using their political power. This point-of-view is essential to
the purpose of this paper. Some theoretical approaches support the
idea that market distortions may lower the productivity threshold nec-
essary for survival. Syverson et al. (2005) suggest a variant of the
market selection model originally proposed by Melitz (2000), one that
introduces market power into the determinants of market selection.
This model generates an equation of exit that represents the choice
plants face as to whether or not they should continue to stay in busi-
ness. The utility function that the model uses includes a term called
the penalty for variety γ (i.e., the cost of substituting between prod-
ucts being consumed)5.
The authors find that if products are less substitutable (meaning they
have more market power, such that γ increases), then there is a lower
cut-off profitability cost level (φ*).This greater market power allows
for the survival of some plants, even when they may have less com-
petitive products due to higher costs, or lower productivities than their
competitors. In this model, the particular value of the exit threshold is
affected by the distributions of demand, efficiency, factor price draws,
technology, and market features.
Our work here deals too with differentiated plants, which belong to
different regions and different sectors with different levels of political
influence. Although we do not portray political power in exactly the
same manner as market power (namely, with penalties for variety),
5 By doing this, market power is introduced, as it creates space for uncompetitive actions
like raising prices above market levels. This means that consumers with a higher ã have a
more limited consumer response to price differences across an industry’s producers.57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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we do not depart from Melitz model as our theoretical basis; specifi-
cally, we solely maintain its basic premise concerning the effects of
distortions on productivity thresholds with respect to a plant’s market
survival. The political influence of a plant grants it protection and
preferential treatment, and causes its cut-off profitability cost level to
decrease. In particular, policies that benefit a sector may help it reach
certain consumers (i.e., the monopolization of a sector in certain re-
gions blocks close substitutes), or maintain lower prices than com-
petitors in spite of having a lower productivity (i.e., the benefits brought
about by tariffs). This makes it costly for the consumer to substitute
between varieties6, as portrayed in Syverson et al.’s model (2005).
Thus, plants benefiting from greater political power may survive even
when there is less demand for their product, higher costs, or lower
productivities (and consequently, higher prices).
The studies that we have referred to so far support the view that re-
search on the mechanism of market selection is important; likewise
that the distortions that are imposed on it are costly in terms of aggre-
gate productivity, and that they affect a process that otherwise would
be productivity enhancing. The empirical results have also shown that
the process is not necessarily smooth and instant, and that plants are
heterogeneous when facing market selection. The roles of reforms
and market distortions in this process have also been commented upon.
The present study seeks to contribute to this strand of literature, where
market selection is studied as a heterogeneous process across plants
and sectors, and where institutions and policies affect it significantly.
In particular, both the reforms themselves and their effects on plant
survival heterogeneity will be approached from a political economic
perspective, particularly when considering the role of special inter-
ests groups.
B. Special interest groups and policies
Lobbying, that is, the contributing to a campaign by special interest
groups (Bonomo et al., 2004), is a fundamental part of policymaking.
6 We allow for products from different sectors to act as substitutes. For instance, using a ciiu
4 classification as we did in section 3, we have canned juices and sodas competing for a
share of the market even thought they are located in different sectors.226 226 226 226 226
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For our purposes, the definition of lobbying can be widened to cover
all political contributions (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) not only
those made to campaigns but those defined as benefits to office-hold-
ers. Special interest groups have been widely studied within the lit-
erature. Grossman and Helpman (2001) review the different models
and approaches dealing with special interest politics. They consider
simple voting models, those representing special interest groups that
have certain information which they lobby to transmit to policymak-
ers; and finally, those concerning special interest groups that seek to
influence policymakers through campaign contributions. In the first
case, the policies chosen correspond to the median voter. In the sec-
ond case, the equilibrium reached is more complicated and depends,
among other aspects, on the weight policymakers give the informa-
tion and the welfare of the general population. In the related models,
a principal-agent approach is followed, whereby special interest groups
signal policymakers, who then decide policy based on the informa-
tion that was given. In the third case, that involving campaign contri-
butions, several possibilities might exist—that there is only one interest
group; that there are many interest groups competing for a particular
policy; that there are several interest groups competing for a particu-
lar policy schedule and seeking to influence policymaking after the
schedule is set. Additionally, models are modified to include legisla-
tive bodies comprised of several parties. Finally, within the models,
some variation exists regarding, for instance, whether contributions
are made to candidates for office before elections (wherein consid-
eration must be made regarding the probability of their being elected);
also whether there is a need for funds to convince the general public
regarding the specific interests of the special interest group in ques-
tion. In all the approaches mentioned in the book (Grossman and
Helpman, 2001), a welfare function is ascribed to policymakers, with
voters welfare and campaign and in-office resources constituting dis-
tinct arguments; however, by introducing employment considerations
we want to indicate that both arguments can be intertwined.
Gasmi et al. (2004) also develop interesting models for describing the
strategic behaviour of plants, in this case, regarding trade issues
(antidumping). They develop signalling games wherein, as is the case
with Grossman and Helpman (2001), there is hidden information, as
well as monetary contributions. Their work focuses on firm-interna-57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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tional trade agency relationships, but we believe that their points-of-
view are applicable to special interest group-policymaker relation-
ships: the resulting equilibrium depends on several aspects, though
trade policy often presents incentives for manipulating information
and making monetary contributions. Again, our work deviates con-
ceptually to some extent from this one, inasmuch as we are consider-
ing special interest groups’ contributions and votes as constituting
one dimension7.
In spite of the importance of the lobbying process, the empirical evi-
dence, especially regarding its magnitude, is not is not easily derived,
partly because lobbying activities are often either legally forbidden,
socially rejected, or both. Still, Hojnacki et al.’s (1998) research on
this subject using a direct questionnaire methodology concludes that
lobbying is a very common practice, and one to which most policy-
makers are subjected8. Gawande and Krishna (2005) test a model us-
ing empirical data and following Grossman and Helpman (1994),
though here, a dichotomous variable is used and there is no capturing
of different continuous levels of lobbying activities.
The existence and intensity of lobbying has strong effects on the
economy, as it consumes resources that could be spent on alternative
productive uses. Groups spend these resources and may get their pre-
ferred policies chosen, even when they do not correspond to what is
most beneficial for the majority with respect to democratic elections.
This happens because special interest groups are more organized than
voters at large, and because the benefits derived of their individual
members is generally larger (Grossman, 1996) than the average ben-
efit derived of regular voters. In general, group action can be more
effective through lobbying than through elections. Most special inter-
est groups do not comprise a majority in votes; at the same time, they
have organizational and pressure-generating skills that easily over-
7 This adds a voting dimension to political influence, beyond the effects of lobbying. This is
done in order to take into account the fact that a favoured sector can bring in votes from
employees, relatives, and generally any citizen that benefits from the improvement of the
conditions in the sector.
8 His project specifically studies the US House of Representatives in 1996.228 228 228 228 228
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come their minority status. However, as mentioned above, the votes
these groups are able to contribute can also constitute an important
complement to lobbying, in addition to direct contributions.
Commitment to the bargaining process depends to a great extent on
the alternative choices groups have (Du Toit, 1987). In the case of
policymaking, politicians confront a situation in which campaign sup-
port is difficult to attain through other means. The same goes for the
representatives of special interests groups. For them, investment that
increases market shares is subject to a cost-benefit analysis in com-
parison to lobbying activities that influence policies; usually the former
are more expensive than the latter. The principle of mutual depend-
ence proposed by Bacharach et al. (1981) states that the relationship
between politicians who are policymakers and lobbyists is strong, and
their level of mutual commitment is powerful. Asymmetry is needed
for bargaining power to exist (Wagner, 1988), and in the case of
policymaking, there are indeed differences in the respective powers
of both bargaining sides to create rents and resources. In contrast to
this position, some theorists say that rents are not created by any one
side of the bargaining process, but rather arise in the market. Politi-
cians and plants then bargain over them (Dorwick, 1989). All these
approaches coincide in highlighting that bargaining is definitely tak-
ing place in situations where political support and policy outcomes
are at stake. In fact, this scene is very appropriate for strong credible
commitments to develop from bargaining.
In the study of lobbying as a way of exerting political influence over
the implementation of policies, trade policy has a special place. Com-
mercial policy, for instance, has always seen much lobbying take place
(Grossman et al., 2004). In commercial policy, the interests of the
economic groups involved are well defined and the benefits concen-
trated. When it comes to trade policy, lobbying is strong, and the groups
that promote it can be rather easily identified (namely, whichever sec-
tor is being affected by tariffs, quotas, etc.). Grossman et al. (1995)
have studied specifically the political process behind protectionist trade
policies. They have theoretically studied the politics of free trade agree-
ments and have divided the process into two steps: first, internal in-
terests determine government preferences; governments then confront
international interests in the agreement negotiations. Here, we are only57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD
229 229 229 229 229
interested in the first step of the political process affecting policy.9
Grossman et al. approach protective measures through the concept of
endogenous protection10. By this, they mean to say that trade meas-
ures are not taken exogenously, but are a result of a process in which
incumbent policymakers maximize their utility. This, in turn, depends
on the amount collected through contributions made by special inter-
ests groups and on the welfare of voters. The authors conclude that
the whole structure of trade protection reflects to a great extent the
outcome of what is a competition for political favour. The structure of
protection for an industry is a function of certain variables, such as
the state of organization of the specific industry. Additionally, they
show that in the presence of competition between special interest
groups, trade policy is the preferred system of special interest groups
for extracting rents from political influence, rather than any other means
of income transfer11.
Some policies show differences in treatment across different groups.
Figure 1 shows that the tariff levels in Colombia have not been homo-
geneous across sectors for the period 1986-1998. The dispersion was
lowered during the period being used for our estimations (1990-1998),
but there are still differences across sectors. It is not a true ex-ante
that all of these differences are politically driven, but this is one pos-
sible explanation that we want to explore.
Along with variation across sectors, variation of nominal tariffs across
time within each sector is also noticeable. We calculate the standard
deviations for each sector across time. The average of the within-sec-
tor deviation for all sectors is 14.8%. When this standard deviation is
taken separately for the period prior to the year of reforms, 1991 (1986-
9 Trade agreements signed by Colombia have still left enough room for national policymak-
ers to direct trade policy in the direction of their choice. For an overview of trade agree-
ments made by Colombia, see Vallejo (2004).
10 Endogenous protection has been studied under the same framework by Grossman and
Helpman (1994) and Gasmi et al. (2004), among others.
11 Grossman et al. 1994. If the government has an efficient way of transferring income at
hand, then it poses a “credible threat to join forces with the opposing lobbies.” Since this
situation leaves groups little lobbying power, they prefer to leave out competition for these
efficient policies, and to bid for trade policies.230 230 230 230 230
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1990) and for the period after 1991 (1991-1998), we get values of
14.1% and 8.6% respectively. On the other hand, the data shows an
average between-sector standard deviation per year of 14.6% for the
period prior to 1991, and of 5.26% for the period after. In both cases,
variability is reduced following the market-oriented reforms of 1991.
However, there seems to be enough variability for tariffs to be in-
cluded in our estimations.
Figure 1. Nominal and Effective Tariffs for Colombia Ciiu4 Rev. 2, 1986-
1998.
When it comes to policies that affect groups heterogeneously, it is
tempting to address the process itself in which these policies are ar-
ranged as one of the necessary steps for understanding the outcome of
policy. Following this idea, we refer to the political economic litera-
ture, especially that dealing with special interest groups, in order to
better understand the phenomenon of differential policies in general,
and of differential tariffs specifically.
The strand of literature on special interest groups, bargaining, and
lobbying shows how this political power affects policymaking proc-
esses, and why this relationship is bound to be strong and recurrent,
due to the interests of both special interest groups and politicians.
Additionally, it is useful for our purpose to emphasize that trade policy
is one area where political influence efforts are concentrated, espe-
cially because of the distinct effects it has on the relevant special in-
terest groups. Also, it supports the idea that lobbyists acquire political
power through campaign contributions. Some more general approaches
also accept other kinds of political contributions. We added the di-
mension of votes, which is not necessarily the most important, but
may act as a complement to other political contributions. Both eco-57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD
231 231 231 231 231
nomic and political (in votes) campaign contributions require a large
and wealthy group to be effectively exerted. Our approach to groups
using political power deals with production sectors, so our interest
revolves around both the political power of the sector, and the eco-
nomic power it holds to exert that power effectively. To follow this
line of thought in this study, we would like to use both economic and
political data to construct an index that captures information about
the political power of economic sectors. Also, since we conclude that
organization also implies an advantage in carrying out political pres-
sure, we want to use variables that give information as to whether or
not a sector has organized lobbying groups or belongs to an important
economic group.
II. Political power variables and influence on policies
The first empirical model features sector level tariffs in order to cap-
ture trade policy as a dependent variable, and explanatory variables
that include a political power index and controls:
(1)
The first challenge we face is to construct a politpower index. We
want to capture political power in a manner that captures both the
economic importance of sector s in different regions r12, weighing the
different regions by the political power of each at the national level.
Politpower is thus constructed as an index comprised of two compo-
nents that capture two effects: the economic importance of sector s in
region r in year t (S) and the political importance of region r in the
whole country in year t (I).
To estimate this equation and the other two models that correspond to
section III and IV, we use variables from several data sources that we
describe next:
12 When referring to regions, we mean the Colombian political division known as a
departamento, the equivalent of a state or province in many countries. Each departamento
has its own executive and legislative body as chosen by popular election.232 232 232 232 232
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The first of these are plant-level measures of economic fundamentals
and plant choices taken from the database created from the Colom-
bian Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS)13 by Eslava et al. (2004).
Also, we take reform indicators constructed by Lora (2001) and trans-
formed by Eslava et al. (2004). We use tariffs data from DNP databases
for the period 1990-1998 too. We use nominal tariffs because this
seems to be the standard convention in the literature. However, some
estimations have been carried out using effective tariffs, and the re-
sults were found to be robust. Among other advantages, the database
based on the AMS features enhanced productivity estimations due to
the existence of plant level prices. This means that the calculated ef-
fects on plant exit will be more accurate, as movements in sector price
indices are not recorded as productivity movements14. Therefore, the
effects of political variables, which we want to control using produc-
tivity levels, are in fact being controlled by accurate variables. The
fundamentals used here are taken from Eslava et al. (2004). Plant
productivity in that database is estimated using plant-level physical
output data and an instrumental variables approach. Demand shocks
are aimed at capturing changes in demand not explained by funda-
mentals. They are calculated from the errors of the production func-
tion estimations, using a linear demand specification as well as
instrumental variables techniques. These shocks are calculated by
Eslava et al. (2004), who describe the process thoroughly.
These variables are used to construct an economic component to the
political power index. We measure how important an economic sector
is in each region, in terms of employees and production. Even though
the sectors are located in different regions, we use regional level vari-
ables and shares as the link used to effective political power, as we
will see in the next section, is the political importance of the region at
the national level.
The second is election outcomes, taken from Registraduria Nacional
printed archives, and compiled and transformed by the authors. All
13 The database contains data taken at the plant level for all industrial sectors. It includes data
for 44,816 plants from the post-reform period (our estimation period). Eslava et al. (2004)
has several tables with the descriptive statistics of this database.
14 See Eslava et al. (2004) for a detailed explanation.57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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calculations are performed for the years 1990-1998, which span over
two presidential and congressional elections. This covers the infor-
mation available so to date for the post-1991 reforms period; during
this period, market-oriented reforms were carried out, starting with
Constitution of 1991. We use the election results for the Presidency
and the Senate15, disaggregated by region. As we explain in the next
section, the location component plays a key role in our study. Citizens
elect the members of the Chamber of Representatives from a list of
candidates that exclusive to each region. The number of candidates
from which each department gets to choose depends basically ex-ante
on its population. This affects the variability of the percentage of the
votes of an elected candidate that comes from one region (it is either
0 or 100%, because all elected candidates in the Chamber are only
elected by only one region), as well as the variability of the share of
votes the region has at the national level (something depending on
factors not related to the political power of sectors). On the contrary,
each Senate candidate is voted for nation-wide; hence, the variability
issues mentioned above do not arise. We want to capture the political
power of a region in a given period using the share of votes it contrib-
uted to elected candidates to the Senate. If a region contributes a large
share of votes to an elected candidate to Senate, it means that the
Senator gives greater political importance to that region. This does
not take into account only a region’s population, but also its voting
participation and political agreement, among others. For these rea-
sons, in attempting to capture a region’s political power in the legisla-
tive branch, we do not use the data for the elections for the Chamber
of Representatives, but rather stick to the Senate results. As was men-
tioned earlier, it was necessary to put together a database containing
information on the results of Senate and Presidential election prior to
1998, since for this period, they were only available in printed for-
mats. Aggregates for the results by candidate and by regions were
also constructed.
A specific region generally has different sectors, some more economi-
cally important than others, which affects the extent to which they
can benefit from the net amount of political importance that the re-
15 The Colombian Congress is comprised of two chambers: a Senate, and a Chamber of Rep-
resentatives.234 234 234 234 234
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gion has in the national political scene. We use the economic impor-
tance (share of output or share of employment16) of each sector in one
region specifically to weigh the effective amount of political impor-
tance that the sector can benefit from in that region. A wealthy sector
means possibly more campaign contributions. A large sector that has
many employees implies more votes. A sector that is responsible for a
large share of the region’s overall output could compromise politi-
cians due to the influence the sector has in all aspects of the region
economy, and its failure would be very visible and harmful to the
politician popularity. In all cases, policy makers from one region tend
to be influenced in their decisions by what is beneficial to an eco-
nomically important sector in that region17.
In conclusion the political power index must capture both the sector’s
economic importance in the region, and the region’s political impor-
tance at the national political level. The political power indices built
here play a key role in this study, and a large part of this section will
be devoted to explaining their construction.
The first part of the politpower index, Ssrt, captures the sector’s eco-
nomic importance in the region. Ssrt is constructed from economic
variables (reflecting the output and the number of employees). The
variables have four different specifications and are constructed in the
following way:
16 We choose employment as a way to capture the number of people directly affected by the
welfare of plants, which can eventually translate into votes. This could imply an underes-
timation of the economic importance of capital intensive plants. However, the results we
reach are robust whether we used the economic importance from production or from em-
ployment.
17 This scheme implies that plants that belong to a sector that is economically important in
one region can exert effective political pressure at the national level if that region is politi-57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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These variables are used to introduce the role of the pure economic
importance of a sector. Greater economic importance increases the
weight policymakers give a sector at the time of choosing between
policies. It is interesting to use the employment and output variables
as lagged variables as well, as affected agents respond to the prefer-
ential treatment of policies with votes and contributions in subsequent
periods. The variables Ssrt present one observation each by sector,
department and year.
The second part of the index shows the political importance of the
regions at the national political level. Its purpose is to capture the
political importance of regions for candidates. Isrt is constructed from
election results. The variables have two different specifications and
are constructed in the following way:
The variable presents one observation for each department for each
year. Consequently, it affects all sectors in any given department. Since
the political candidates elected remain the same18 for a period of four
years, the values of Irt are repeated for those four years. Finally, equa-
tions (2) and (3) are brought together to construct different versions
of politpower. This measure has an observation for every department,
year and sector:
(4)
cally important itself. However, if the region has no significant voting importance, wealthy
sectors in that region cannot make effective use of this wealth to transform it into political
influence at a national level. Something similar happens to economically unimportant sec-
tors located in a politically influential region. These cannot profit from the region’s voting
significance due to their own regional unimportance.
18 Changes within periods only occurred in the Senate. Senators who resign from office give
up their places to candidates belonging to their political party and that were known by the
electorate at the time of election. We assume that a replacement’s relationship to special
interests groups and groups of voters remains the same as that of the original senator.236 236 236 236 236
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In the equation described by (1), we use tariffs as policy indicators;
these vary between sectors, but not between departments. Conse-
quently, the influence of a sector is conveyed to national policymak-
ers through its respective region. Benefits of the derived influence are
received by the sector nation-wide as well. We therefore construct an
aggregate variable at the sector level, capturing the importance of the
sector across all regions in the country. This variable varies across
sectors, so as to exploit sector variability in the political power indi-
cator—this is in order to explain sector variability in tariffs. The new
variable has one observation for each sector for each year:
(5)
According to the definition of poltot in (5), wherein we combine Srt
(2) and Irt (3), we get 8 different variables19. The empirical model to
be estimated is given by
(6)
Here, each observation corresponds to the data at the sector level for
year t. Since the original variables in the database of economic data
are found at the plant level, sector averages are taken, and estimations
made, weighted by the number of plants. The variables are constructed
exactly as we described at the beginning of this section20 Tradecol is a
trade reform index, initially developed by Lora (2001) for several Latin
American countries for the period 1985-1999. Tradecol increases along
with the level of reform and therefore shows the degree of openness
to trade. The inclusion of this variable is for the purpose of capturing
a country’s overall stance on trade policy, a factor that affects tariffs
but is not attributable to the actions of any specific sector. For this, we
19 The indices we get then are: poltotprod (Sprod and Isen), poltotemp (Sempl and Isen), poltotprodlag
(Sprodlag and Isen), and poltotemplag (Semplag and Isen) using Senate results, and poltotprodpres
(Sprod and Ipres), poltotemplpres (Sempl and Ipres), poltotprodlagpres (Sprodlag and Ipres), and
poltotemplagpres (Semplag and Ipres), using the results from the presidential elections.
20 Each plant has data on its corresponding department and sector. For example, since
politpower has a value per sector per department per year, each plant is assigned its value
of politpower according to the sector and department it is located in, and the year to which
its values correspond.57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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use a transformed version of Eslava et al. (2004)21. Xst is a vector of
control variables—. In this case, it only includes gdp growth and po-
litical cycle effects22; the latter are dummies for each year of a politi-
cian’s term in office.
Economic association (gremios) (EAs) is a dummy variable created
following a review we made of several documents23, mainly lists re-
ported by the National Association of Industries (ANDI). If the sector
belongs to an EA, then the variable has a value of 1; otherwise, it has
a zero value. The same process was applied to create a dummy vari-
able identifying sectors represented in one of the four most important
economic groups (EGs)24. As mentioned in the special interests groups
review, organization plays a very important role with respect to a
group’s potential to convey their interests into effective political in-
fluence. In fact, group cohesion, the organization of common activi-
ties, and a concentration in preferences is what allows them to effect
enough pressure to get policies carried out that are beneficial to them,
even when they may be harmful to the population at large. These
dummy variables are intended to capture the importance of belonging
to these organized groups. However, the index of political power is
still important, because the dummy variables do not capture variabil-
ity over time; the quantitative dimension of the political power of a
sector; or other ways by which political power can be exerted besides
belonging to a group. These ‘other ways’ include the votes from indi-
21 The transformation basically consists of re-scaling the index for Colombia so that the ob-
servation showing the most liberalized state of trade reforms in the country equals one, and
the least equals zero.
22 The political cycle refers to the differences existing in policies based on what point a poli-
tician is in his term. For example, a politician may be more willing to engage in large
amounts of public expenditure during the final year of his term—despite its effects on
future public finances—as his immediate interest is to make a favorable impression on the
voters in order to get himself or his party re-elected.  This means, for example, that public
expenditures may follow a cycle caused by political determinants. For a further explana-
tion, see Eslava et al. 2005.
23 We use data mainly coming from Echavarría et al. (2000), Rettberg (1998), and Lora (2000).
24 Angelika Rettberg identifies the four most important economic groups in Colombia: el
Grupo Empresarial Bavaria, la Organización Ardila Lulle, la Organización Sarmiento
Angulo, el Sindicato Antioqueño. Una Mirada Crítica a los Gremios Colombianos, 1998,
Departamento de Ciencia Política Universidad de los Andes.238 238 238 238 238
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viduals benefiting from that specific sector’s welfare, the temporary
lobbying movements of a sector that do not constitute a permanent EA
or EG, and the regional visibility that an important sector’s welfare can
bring a politician. Whenever the political power index appears in a model
together with the dummy variables, it should be interpreted as the effect
of political power that comes from the economic importance of a sector
in a politically important region, one that is exerted through channels
other than belonging to an EA and/or an EG.
As a cross-check to our construction of the political power index,
variable case studies are taken from Echavarría et al. (2000), from
selected sectors that have been historically favoured by policies due
to strong lobbies; these are compared against our measure of political
power. To determine whether the political power index (poltotst) be-
haves in a manner consistent with the evidence from these case stud-
ies, the sectors are ordered from lowest to highest according to their
political power index value. This is done for every political power
index specification listed in Table 1. If at least 70%25 of the sectors
considered by Echavarría et al. (2000) as being historically favoured
by policies are on the top half of the ordered arrangement, then the
variable is considered to agree with the evidence (indicated as ‘YES’
in the sixth column of the table). All cases are found to agree with the
historical evidence.
Correlations are also calculated between political power and EA and
EG categorization. Correlations are significant and positive but not
very high, which means that sectors with higher political power indi-
ces tend to belong (though not necessarily) to an EA and EG. Addi-
tionally, the fact that the correlations are not close to 1 means that the
EA and EG variables provide additional information over what is con-
veyed by the political power indices. This justifies introducing them
into the estimations—they act as a complement to the political power
indices in explaining the effects of political power.
The following table summarizes the cross-checks created on the po-
litical power indices:
25 The threshold level is defined by the authors.57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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Table 1. Political power indices relationships.
poltotprod Sprod Isen 0.65 0.56 YES
poltotprodpres Sprod Ipres 0.54 0.55 YES
poltotemp Sempl Isen 0.63 0.53 YES
poltotempres Sempl Ipres 0.64 0.62 YES
poltotemplag Semplag Isen 0.57 0.58 YES
poltotemplagpres Semplag Ipres 0.64 0.68 YES
We estimate model 6 to test for the effect of political power on sec-
tors’ tariffs. The results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. The determinants of tariffs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
poltotprod  poltotprod  poltotemplag poltotemplag
Political power  0.1103* 0.0973* 0.1145* 0.1009*
(0.0107) (0.0108)  (0.0109) (0.0111)
Trade reform -3.6981* -3.6536* -3.7022* -3.6574*
 (0.3013)  (0.2926)  (0.2997) (0.2918)
Economic sector
association - 0.0318 - 0.1804*
(0.0416) (0.0034)
Economic group - 0.2609* - 0.2495*
(0.0686) (0.0687)
R square 0.5134 0.5452 0.5185 0.5480
N 261 261 261 261
Notes: The dependant variable equals nominal tariffs averaged for the ciiu 3 sector level (weighted
by the number of plants at the ciiu 4 level, since that is the level for the tariffs data). This table reports
the results of the model estimated using ordinary least squares, with fixed effects to account for
differences across sectors. The political cycle and gdp growth controls were included as well. Tests
were to check for error homoskedasticiy. Asterisks denote significance at the 5% level. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. For definitions of poltotprod, and poltotemplag, see Table 1.
Different specifications of the model are estimated, each using a dif-
ferent specification of the political power index. The model is esti-
mated using ordinary least squares with fixed effects in order to account
for sector differences. Some models are also estimated controlling for



















 to historical case
studies of strong
lobby groups.240 240 240 240 240
The Politics of Market Selection
Luis Eduardo Quintero
The effect of political power on tariffs26 is positive and significant.
This result shows that having higher political power results in more
protection from these trade policies, even when controlling for the
general stance of trade reform. A negative effect for/ trade reform
index is expected and obtained, because the general trend of trade
reform during the period was to open the economy to international
markets. The effect is also significant. The effect of the variables in-
dicating whether or not plants in a sector belong to EAs and EGs have
a significant and positive effect in all but one case. When they are
introduced, the political power effect decreases, but remains signifi-
cant, which shows that part of the political power influence comes
from belonging to the mentioned associations and groups. The effect
of the political power index does not change regardless of whether we
use that containing/accounting for production or the one containing/
accounting for employees. We also find that the effect of political
power calculated using votes for presidential elections shows consist-
ently higher values than the effect of the index calculated using Sen-
ate elections’ votes. However, the differences are not large.
In summary, these results indicate that a plant in an economically
important sector in a politically important region can gain oneself
policy favours, at least in the case of trade policy. Despite the fact that
tariffs are laws, and therefore are legislated by the Congress, this re-
sult tells us that in the Colombian political system, the President still
has a strong/an important role in determining trade policy.
III. Political power and market selection
In this section, we propose an empirical model that tests the effect of
political power on the probability of plants exiting the market. Fol-
lowing the discussion in the literature review, we estimate a probit
market selection model that, just like/much like the market selection
equation in Syverson et al. (2005), includes market fundamentals as
well as a variable representing a source of power or protection in market
performance (in this case political power). The empirical model fol-
26 The results using nominal tariffs are reported since it is a standard in the literature. How-
ever, effective tariffs are also used, and the results are mentioned as well.57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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lowing the intuition discussed and estimated in this section is described
as follows:
(7)
A probit model is used, and the marginal effects are reported. Exit is
defined as follows:
(8)
Both poltot and the trade reform index hold the same definitions as in
Section II. We expect political power to have a negative effect on the
probability of exit, as it increases the threshold of minimum perform-
ance levels required for survival, as introduced in the Melitz model
mentioned in the literature review. We again use the reform indices
constructed by Lora (2001) and transformed by Eslava et al. (2004).
In fact, Eslava et al. (2005) already used these reform indices for his
market selection estimations; we are interested in testing them here
again to control for the country’s general stance on trade reform as
well as the rest of reforms. The Tradecol index is the same index we
used in the model defined by equation (6) and explained in Section II.
The Other reforms index refers to the composite index calculated by
Eslava et al. (2004) using the data gathered by Lora (2001). This in-
dex averages the indices corresponding to labour, financial, tax, and
privatization reforms.
We also use fundamentals to control for a plant’s economic traits that
may also affect the probability of its exiting. The fundamentals used
here are: lagged productivity (TFPlag), the logarithm of energy and
material prices (lprelag, lprmlag), the logarithm of production (lprod),
the demand shock (directsh2lag), the elasticity of demand (elas2lag),
and the interactions of some of these variables with reform measures.
We use demand shocks and elasticities of demand as constructed by
Eslava et al. (2005). We expect productivity to reduce the probability
of exit, ceteris paribus, because of lower costs and larger profits. We
expect the latter two factors to affect a plant’s performance as they242 242 242 242 242
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represent changes in market power. In particular, we expect shocks
and elasticities to have a negative and positive effect respectively.
Finally, production is used to control for the size of plants. Interac-
tions with reforms are included as well to test whether the liberaliza-
tion of the economy has changed the degree to which political power
affects market selection. To test for robustness, sector tariffs are in-
cluded in some versions of the estimated models. The results for esti-
mations of the model given by equation (7) are reported in Table 3.
The results agree with the intuition we proposed. Most of the results
are robust to the changes in the specification.
Table 3. The effect of political power on exit probability.
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4)
poltotprod -.0254* (.0086) -.0333* (.0091) -.0268* (.0085) -.0333* (.0091)
Lagged productivity -.0099* (.0025) - .0097* (.0025) -.0099* (.0025) -.0097* (.0025)
Lagged demand
shocks -.0192* (.0009) -.0187 * (.0009) -.0192* (.0009) -.0187* (.0009)
Output prices .0174* (0.003) .0164 * (.0035) .0174*  (.0035) .0164* (.0035)
Tariffs .1447* (.0429) .1447* (.0429)
Trade reform -.0051 (.0552) -.0026 (.0553) -.0051 (.0552) -.0026 (.0553)
Other reforms .0841* (0.041) .1001* (.0419) .0841* (.0415) .1001* (.0419)
Economic association -.0763* (.0315) -.0980* (.0345)
Economic group .0292* (.0075) .0024 (.0146)
Poltot interacted with
trade reform .0564* (.0127) .0582* (.0130) .0564* (.0127) .0582* (.0130)
Poltot interacted with
reforms other than
trade -.0394* (.0104) -.0324 * (.0105) -.0394* (.0104) -.0324* (.0105)
Likelihood ratio -8149.7087 -8100.4924 -8149.7087 -8100.4924
N 28,786 28,598 28,786 28,598
Notes: The dependant variable is the probit of a dichotomous variable that indicates staying in or
exiting from the market at time t. A generalized linear model estimation using probit link function
was used (probit model). Asterisks denote significance at the 5% level. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Gdp growth controls are included as well as a control for time trend. Sector controls
are used as well. For a definition of poltotprod, see Table 1.
The effect of political power on the probability of exit is negative, and
significant, or all versions of the political power index. This happens
both when the model is estimated using the political power measure
based on Senate votes (reported) and when it is estimated using that
based on presidential votes. Once again, it is slightly more conven-
ient for a sector to be politically significant for the President than for
the Senate. The results are robust for the inclusion of population con-
trols. When included, the EG and EA dummy variables show/elicit57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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different types of behaviour. The EA shows a significant negative ef-
fect on the probability of exit. In contrast, the EG is sometimes posi-
tive and only slightly significant, and sometimes, not significant at
all. This means that belonging to an economic association can repre-
sent an advantage in terms of shielding plants from factors that would
otherwise make them exit the market. Productivity causes a negative
and significant effect on the probability of exit, which confirms the
link between productivity and market selection. As expected, the more
productive plants are less likely to go out of business. However, other
variables also prove to be determinants of the probability of exit. Plants
that are exposed to larger demand shocks, for instance, also have a
smaller probability of exiting the market. The trade reform index shows
no significance in the regressions using the aggregate political power
indicator (5). On the other hand, the indicator for other reforms has a
negative and significant effect. This probably means that reforms have
made plants stronger and better able to endure difficulties that would
otherwise have driven them out of the market. One possible example
of this is financial reforms, which give smaller plants access to credit
and thus help them to get around hard times. Interactions between
these reforms show that political power loses influence as trade re-
forms open markets. Still, even if we start from a situation where trade
reforms as well as other reforms are at their most liberalized stage,
political power continues to show an overall negative effect on the
probability of a plant exiting.
IV. The costs of political power influence
Finally, we seek to estimate the effects of political power on aggre-
gate productivity. Our main motivation comes from what we conceive
as the costs political power cause, on efficient reallocation, market
selection, and overall productivity. Here, we try to measure these costs.
In order to do this, we follow a simple approach that seeks to describe
the link between the aggregate productivity of a sector and its politi-
cal power. In doing this, we emphasize our point that plants that are
still in business are either productive enough to be making profits; are
receiving positive demand shocks; or, although not particularly pro-
ductive, are benefiting from political power and obtaining protection
that allows them to survive in spite of low productivity levels. Put244 244 244 244 244
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another way, the productivity levels of surviving plants are determined
not only by economic variables, but by political power as well.
We follow the argument discussed in Section I.A., that political power
affects the distribution of shares, inclusive of those plants driven out
of the market; this in turn affects aggregate productivity. Aggregate
productivity here is calculated first at the sector-level. To do this, we
add together the productivities of all the plants in the sector, each
weighted by its share of production in the sector. Reallocation thus
affects aggregate productivity, not only through the exiting of plants,
but through the weights used (i.e., the shares of production). Since
political power allows low productivity plants to survive and grab
hold of production shares, we would expect it to negatively affect the
aggregate productivity of sectors and of the economy in general. In
this way, we can see that, despite the fact that productivity at the plant
level is defined as a random shock, reallocation processes do affect
aggregate productivity.
Our empirical model estimates the correlation between aggregate pro-
ductivity at the sector level as a dependant variable and political power,
controlling for several effects. The model is given by:
(9)
In this model, aggregate productivity is calculated using plant level
productivities as calculated by Eslava et al. (2004). Tariffs and politi-
cal power index (equation (5)) are already at the sector level. In some
versions of the model we use an EA and EG in order that we might
include the political power stemming from these groups. We include
tariffs to control for the effects of protective measures on productiv-
ity. We already discussed in Section II how tariffs depend to a certain
extent on political power. However, we still include them in order to
take account of the effects of trade policy that do not depend upon
political power. When they are introduced, the political power index
should be interpreted as influence that is transmitted through chan-
nels other than tariffs. These other channels, as we have mentioned,
might be public expenditure directed towards sector production, sub-
sidies and tax exemptions, or access to preferential treatment in fi-
nancial markets, and so forth. We are aware of the fact that the inclusion57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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of tariffs in the determination of productivity may introduce a poten-
tial endogeneity problem, since tariffs may be affected to some extent
by certain industry traits such as sector aggregate productivity, our
dependant variable.
Robustness checks are carried out and the results are mentioned be-
low. We expect a negative effect from political power on aggregate
productivity. As we have argued before, political influence may allow
unproductive but politically influential plants to survive, even if they
have low productivity levels. More than simply surviving, it allows
them to gain larger production shares of their markets than would be
possible without political power influence. In conclusion, plants that
belong to politically influential sectors may survive despite low
productivities, thus lowering aggregate productivity through two chan-
nels—their own low productivities and the larger27 share of produc-
tion they contribute to the calculation of the aggregate.
Demand shocks were included to account for the fact that different
aspects of the market may also affect aggregate productivity28. De-
mand shocks were transformed from the plant level to the sector level
by taking sector averages.
Several versions of the model were estimated29. Table 4 shows one
representative result.
27 These low productivity plants would otherwise have lower shares, and eventually zero
shares, when the plants drop out of the market.
28 For instance, a large average demand shock could benefit the plants in a sector, securing
them enough profits to survive even if they have low productivity levels or higher than
average prices.
29 The results for the estimations made with political power calculated using Senate votes are
reported as usual. Some general results for political power derived from presidential votes
are commented upon.246 246 246 246 246
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Table 4. Estimation of productivity with fundamentals and political power.
Regressor: aggregate Political power index calculated Political power index calculated
productivity at the using production: using employment:
sector level poltotprod poltotemplag
Political power -.0373* -.0387*
(.01000)  (.0101)




Economic association -.0908* -.0924*
(.0375) (.0374)




Notes: Asterisks denote the significance at the 5% level (p-values lower than 0.05). Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Clustered regressions were used to correct group-wise panel-
heteroskedasticty. Gdp growth controls were included as well. For definitions of poltotprod, and
poltotemp, see Table 1.
In general, political power is found to have a significant negative ef-
fect on aggregate productivity, as expected. The magnitude is slightly
larger with the political power that stems from presidential elections,
but the direction and significance are similar. The same negative and
significant effect is found for demand shocks. Tariffs are not found to
have a significant effect in any case. The potential endogeneity prob-
lem we mentioned could be part of the reason why the tariffs do not
come out as being significant. Robustness checks were carried out to
avoid this problem. The same model was used introducing the trade
reform index in the place of tariffs. Since this variable is an aggregate
30 Clustered regressions were used to separate errors with different variances; consequently,
there is not one single R-square. The F-statistic hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is
rejected with a p-value of 0.0000.57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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of all policy for all sectors, endogeneity is not probable: one could not
say that it is influenced by the aggregate productivity of a single sec-
tor. In this case, the related reform index turns out not to be signifi-
cant, showing the same behaviour as tariffs. The instrumental variables
technique was also used to prevent more directly the potential
endogeneity problem caused by the tariff variable. We used political
power and the variables indicating whether or not plants belong to
economic groups and/or economic associations as an instrument for
tariffs. Again, tariffs turn out not to be significant.
It can be seen then that political power influence affects aggregate
productivity through other channels. This does not mean, however,
that general benefits related to trade policy do not affect aggregate
productivity. This result only accounts for nominal tariffs, which are
only a part of trade policy. Trade policy benefits other than tariffs
might still be captured by political power. Belonging to an economic
association shows a robust, significant negative effect on aggregate
productivity. We might thus say that the political influence coming
from economic associations can also bring protection to unproduc-
tive plants. By contrast, the influence of economic groups is not im-
portant to the dynamics of aggregate productivity, and in all cases, its
effect is not significant.
Following this estimation, aggregate productivity at the sector level
is estimated both with and without accounting for the effect of politi-
cal power. The predicted values in each case (one per sector per year)
are aggregated, using the shares of production in the economic output
of each sector for each year as weights. From this, we obtain one
single value accounting for the effect of political power and one ig-
noring it. Comparing the two shows us the cost implied by the distor-
tion imposed by political power on the allocation process. According
to our model, political power decreases aggregate productivity by an
average of 4.35%. Additionally, the estimated aggregate productivity
at the sector level is calculated ignoring both the effects of political
and economic power and the effect of belonging to economic groups
and/or economic associations. In this case, political influence reduces
aggregate productivity by an average of 9.86%.248 248 248 248 248
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Table 5. The costs of political power on aggregate productivity.
Calculated aggregate
political power index used
productivity Calculated using production: Calculated using employment:
poltotprod poltotemplag
1. Aggregate productivity using
Eslava et al. (2004) data .9807359 (.9447 / 1.0167) .9807359 (.9447 / 1.0167)
2. Aggregate productivity
estimated using the Model .9807358 (.9683 / .9932) .9807358 (.9681 / .9933)
3. Aggregate productivity
with no political power effect 1.022649 (1.0116 / 1.0337) 1.02502 (1.0141 / 1.0359)
4. Aggregate productivity
with no political power effect
or economic associations effect 1.075874 (1.0672 / 1.0846) 1.079208 (1.0707 / 1.0877)
Number of observations 261
Notes: The arithmetic means of each variable is reported. The 95% confidence interval is reported
inside parentheses to show the lower and upper limit values that the variable could take. Variable
1 is calculated using productivities taken directly from Eslava et al. (2004). Variable 2 is calculated
using the prediction of the model defined by (9). Variable 3 is calculated using the prediction of the
model defined by (9), though imposing the restriction that the coefficient of the political power
index is zero. Variable 4 is calculated using the prediction of the version of the model defined by
(9) that includes the economic associations variables EG and EA, and imposes the restrictions that
both the coefficients of the political power index and of the economic association variables are
zero. For definitions of poltotemplag, and poltotemplag, see Table 1.
V. Conclusions
Political power has been found to be an important factor in the way
plants interact with economic conditions. The index we constructed
was cross-checked, comparing it to variables that indicated the repre-
sentation of the sectors in economic associations and economic cor-
porate groups, and to case studies of sectors favored by policies related
to Colombian industry. The index performed fairly well in these tests.
In the first empirical exercise, political power proved to be an impor-
tant determinant of trade policies. This influence on policies was then
shown to affect the dynamics of reallocation facing plants, namely
market selection. The benefits go beyond trade policy and are trans-
mitted through other channels as well. These other channels are cap-
tured by controlling for protection and introducing tariffs to the model.
The effect of membership in economic groups and economic associa-
tions behaves almost constantly, just like the political power index,
though there were some cases that were not significance.57 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2006
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In general, we can conclude that a plant with large political power
benefits from convenient policies, particularly, though not exclusively,
those related to trade protection. Moreover, it benefits in such a way
that it is able to maintain lower productivity levels and still survive.
This leads us to consider the effects on aggregate productivity. Politi-
cal power allows low productivity plants to maintain large market
shares; in the absence of political power, they would probably drop
out and have lower or even zero shares. Thus, political power has a
harmful effect on aggregate productivity. We find that removing the
distortive effects of political power increases aggregate productivity
by up to 9.86% annually.
Further study might go further in studying the effects of political power
on other kinds of policies that can be assigned to specific sectors.
Such study would seem relevant given the importance of the variable
‘other reforms’ in market selection estimations.
Additionally, some improvement in the estimations remains to be done
so as to account for other aspects that may affect both policies and
market selection processes. For instance, we might consider the di-
rect effects of liberalization on productivity that come from exposure
to competition and access to higher quality, cheaper inputs (Amiti,
2005). Also, it would be useful to capture the heterogeneity in plant
responses to reforms and changes in policies (Schor, 2004). Although
we try to capture the heterogeneity in plant response by introducing
several traits of the plant analyzed (e.g., sector effects, membership in
economic groups), we could still strengthen estimations by taking into
account the nature of the industry being considered (whether import-
ing or exporting, capital or labour intensive).
Additionally, it would enrich the scope of analysis if we re-built the
political power index by calculating it as a weighted average of the
economic and political components, with weights á and 1- á respec-
tively. By changing á, we could then perform simulations and analy-
ses of political and economic reforms on plants political power itself.
Finally, this study could be enriched by expanding the period consid-
ered. In this case, the analysis of political trends (political cycles, rep-
etitions of terms, compositions of congress) could be expanded upon.250 250 250 250 250
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